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INTRODUCTION
The United States has always relied in part on surveillance practices to obtain information about foreign governments, international
and domestic organizations, and citizens of the United States. The
twentieth century exemplifies this behavior. In 1918, the Overman
Committee was established to investigate pro-German sentiments,
and later investigated the influence of Communist Bolsheviks in the
1
United States. In 1930, the Fish Committee was established to investigate people and organizations suspected of being involved with or
2
supporting Communist activities in the United States. From 1934–
1937, the Special Committee on Un-American Activities Authorized
to Investigate Nazi Propaganda and Certain Other Propaganda Activities, also known as the McCormack-Dickstein Committee, was
formed to investigate how Nazi propaganda came into the United
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States, and to investigate the organizations spreading it. During
World War II, the House Committee on Un-American Activities
(“HUAC”) was established as a special investigating committee of the
4
House of Representatives. HUAC succeeded the Fish Committee
and the McCormack-Dickstein Committee, and was developed to investigate alleged disloyalty and subversive actions by private citizens,
public employees, and those organizations suspected of having
5
6
Communist ties. HUAC became a permanent committee in 1945,
but it slowly lost favor until it was denounced by President Harry
Truman in 1959 as the “most un-American thing in the country to7
day.”
However, surveillance by the United States became hotly contested again in the 1970s, due to the widespread disapproval of the
Vietnam War and the unfolding of the Watergate scandal. The United States Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, more commonly known
as the Church Committee, investigated intelligence-gathering methods by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation for illegality. New laws, such as the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, regarding proper surveillance procedures were developed as a result of these investigations.
Due to the globalization of computer usage and the Internet, the
effectiveness and applicability of these laws may be diminishing. Terrorists have become quite sophisticated in carrying out their terrorism plans, and it seems like the rest of the world is always reacting defensively to the newest terrorism means. However, the non-terrorists
could be on the offensive by exploring a possible new medium that
can be used by terrorist organizations—virtual worlds.
Although there has been no public proof to date of terrorists de8
9
vising plots in virtual worlds such as World of Warcraft, Second Life,
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Sam Tanenhaus, Investigating Un-American Activities, Now and Then, N.Y. TIMES: ARTS BEAT
(Mar. 9, 2011, 5:00 PM), http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/09/investigatingun-american-activities-now-and-then/.
HUAC (House Un-American Activities Committee), HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/
topics/house-un-american-activities-committee (last visited Feb. 17, 2012).
Id.
See ROBERT K. CARR, THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES 1945–1950, at
19 (1952) (describing HUAC as “one of the most remarkable procedural coups in modern Congressional history”).
STEPHEN J. WHITFIELD, THE CULTURE OF THE COLD WAR 124 (1996) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
WORLD OF WARCRAFT, http://us.battle.net/wow/en/ (last visited May 9, 2011).
SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com/ (last visited May 9, 2011).
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and others, some members of Congress and some terrorism ex11
perts fear that this is next on the agenda for terrorist organizations.
Terrorists can be rehearsing attacks in these virtual worlds, just like
the United States military trains with commercial “shoot-em-up
12
games.” Virtual world massive multiplayer games make it easy to
contact and assemble plotters from around the world. Virtual worlds
are hard to monitor because a user account name is a pseudonym for
the individual user, the access is global, and the language used may
be hard to decode. Therefore, using virtual worlds to carry out terrorist activities, recruit, communicate, and launder money may require the United States either to use existing law or create new legislation that permits the federal government or Internet service
providers (“ISPs”) to monitor this type of conduct in the virtual
world.
This Article is divided into three Parts: I. Surveillance before the
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (“9/11”) in the United
13
States; II. Surveillance post-9/11; and III. Surveillance in the virtual
world. Specifically, Part I will provide a general discussion about
United States surveillance law before 9/11. Part II will discuss how
surveillance law changed due to 9/11. Finally, Part III will focus on
the applicability of the United States’ surveillance laws to virtual
worlds and how to protect the United States from the possible use of
virtual worlds to engage in terrorist activity.
I. SURVEILLANCE BEFORE 9/11
Citizens of the United States have always been entitled to protection from intrusions by the federal government into their private
conversations and communications. The Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and statutory provisions such as Title III of
the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act (“Wiretap Act”), the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”), and the Communica10
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AM),
http://www.news.com.au/top-stories/spies-watch-rise-of-virtual-terrorists/storye6frfkp9-1111114075761 (“[T]errorism experts are warning that [Second Life] attacks
have ramifications for the real world.”).
Noah Shachtman, Pentagon Researcher Conjures Warcraft Terror Plot, WIRED (Sept. 15, 2008,
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(2004).
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tions Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (“CALEA”) have protected
this right. However, each of these laws has loopholes that can be
used to circumvent ordinary privacy expectations. Additionally, National Security Letters can also be used to obtain records of transactional data, further circumventing privacy expectations. This Part will
address the enactment and application of each of these laws prior to
9/11.
A.

Fourth Amendment Protection

One way the federal government is prohibited from monitoring
its citizens’ communications is through the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. The Fourth Amendment states, “The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vi14
olated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”
An individual’s Fourth Amendment rights are implicated when the
federal government’s conduct amounts to a “search.”
In the United States Supreme Court case, Katz v. United States, Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, established a two-prong test to
15
determine when government action constitutes a search. First, does
the individual have an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy?
Second, does society recognize that this expectation is (objectively)
16
reasonable? The standard to evaluate whether a search is reasonable requires assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to
which it is needed to advance a legitimate governmental interest.
When an individual is in public, such as driving, talking outside to
a friend, or shopping at a mall, there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy. Because anyone can observe his or her behavior, an individual does not have an actual expectation of privacy regarding conduct
in public. Furthermore, there is no objective expectation of privacy
in these scenarios because it would be unreasonable for society to
think that actions in public are private actions entitled to Fourth
Amendment protection. In contrast, conduct in one’s home is considered private because a home is one’s personal space, and the
home is considered sacrosanct. However, if individuals present outside of one’s private home can hear a conversation occurring inside
the home, or can smell an odor coming from the home, there is no
14
15
16

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id.
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reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of that conversation
17
or odor. Only activity contained within the home is covered by an
increased expectation of privacy. Once the activity can be observed
or noticed outside the home, it loses this higher form of protection.
Under most circumstances, conduct inside an individual’s home is
expected to be protected from government intrusion; society would
find this expectation reasonable because a government’s interest in
intruding into the sanctity of one’s home is generally outweighed by
18
an individual’s privacy interest.
Generally, a search is considered unreasonable unless there is a
warrant issued by a neutral magistrate supported by probable cause.
However, there are some exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement for a search. The ones relevant here are consent to
19
20
be searched, exigent circumstances, and whether evidence is lo21
cated in plain view. First, the consent exception applies when an
individual voluntarily agrees to be monitored under certain circumstances. This voluntary agreement eliminates any reasonable expectation of privacy in such conduct. Second, exigent circumstances exist
when there is an emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect, or to thwart the destruction of
evidence. There is no standard test for determining whether such
circumstances exist, and in each case the extraordinary situation must
22
be measured by the facts known by officials. However, those circumstances must “cause a reasonable person to believe that entry (or
other relevant prompt action) was necessary to prevent physical harm
to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence,
the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly
23
frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts.” Exigency may be
17
18
19
20

21
22
23

Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, EFF SURVEILLANCE SELF-DEFENSE PROJECT, https://ssd.eff.
org/your-computer/govt/privacy (last visited May 9, 2011).
See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[A] man’s home is, for most purposes,
a place where he expects privacy . . . .”).
J. SCOTT HARR & KÄREN M. HESS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 219 (3d ed. 2005).
United States v. Smith, 797 F.2d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 1986) (explaining that a warrantless
search conducted by police officers is constitutional when there are exigent circumstances, and any seizure of evidence as a result is permissible).
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990) (determining that a warrantless seizure of
evidence in plain sight is not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment).
People v. Ramey, 545 P.2d 1333, 1341 (Cal. 1976) (discussing whether exigent circumstances exist is based upon an evaluation of the facts as they are known to an officer).
United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824
(1984).
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determined by a variety of factors, such as the degree of urgency involved, the amount of time needed to get a warrant, whether evidence is about to be removed or destroyed, and/or ready destructibil24
ity of the evidence. Third, the plain view doctrine is applicable
when three factors are satisfied: a) the officer is lawfully present at
the place where the evidence can be plainly viewed; b) the officer has
a lawful right of access to the object; and c) the incriminating charac25
ter of the object is “immediately apparent.” If any of these excep26
tions apply, then there is no reasonable expectation of privacy;
therefore, the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment are
not implicated.
B. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
Another mechanism prohibiting the federal government from
monitoring its citizens’ communications is Title III of the Omnibus
27
Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968. Title III is better known
28
as the Wiretap Act. Briefly, the Wiretap Act addresses the issuance
of domestic criminal surveillance warrants. Specifically, the Wiretap
Act: “[1] prohibits the unauthorized, nonconsensual interception of
29
‘wire, oral, or electronic communications’ by government agencies
as well as private parties[; 2] establishes procedures for obtaining
warrants to authorize wiretapping by government officials[;] and [3]
regulates the disclosure and use of authorized intercepted communi30
cations by investigative and law enforcement officers.”
The procedures established in order to obtain a warrant authorizing wiretapping by a government official are similar to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement. The Wiretap Act permits a judge
to issue a warrant authorizing interception of communications for up
to thirty days upon a showing of probable cause that the interception

24
25

26
27
28
29

30

United States v. Reed, 935 F.2d 641, 642 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 960 (1991) (discussing various factors to consider when determining if exigent circumstances exist).
Horton, 496 U.S. at 136–37 (internal quotation marks omitted) (outlining the elements of
the plain view doctrine in order to establish the constitutionality of a warrantless search
under these circumstances).
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, supra note 17.
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2006).
The Nature and Scope of Governmental Electronic Surveillance Activity, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY
& TECH. (July 2006), http://www.cdt.org/wiretap/wiretap_overview.html.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a) (2006). The term “electronic communications” was added by
Title I of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act in 1986. See Privacy & Civil Liberties,
JUST. INFO. SHARING, http://it.ojp.gov/default.aspx?area=privacy&page=1284 (last visited
Feb. 6, 2012).
Privacy & Civil Liberties, supra note 29.
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will reveal evidence that “an individual is committing, has committed,
31
or is about to commit a particular offense” listed in 18 U.S.C. § 2516.
However, the Wiretap Act’s warrant requirement can be overcome
by a variety of exceptions. First, like the exigent circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, the Wiretap
Act’s warrant requirement can be overcome by
any investigative or law enforcement officer, specially designated by the
Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Associate Attorney
General, or by the principal prosecuting attorney of any State or subdivision thereof acting pursuant to a statute of that State, who reasonably determines
that . . . an
emergency
situation
exists
that
involves . . . immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to any
person, [or there are] conspiratorial activities threatening the national
security interest . . . that require[] a wire, oral, or electronic communication to be intercepted before an order authorizing such interception can,
32
with due diligence, be obtained . . . .

Basically, this exception applies when it has been reasonably determined that an emergency situation exists that requires information to
be intercepted without delay. An emergency situation is one that
could result in immediate death or serious physical injury to any person, or that involves a conspiracy that threatens the national security
interest of the United States.
Second, like the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement, the Wiretap Act also has a consent exception.
This exception states that “[i]t shall not be unlawful . . . for a person
acting under color of law to intercept a[n] . . . electronic communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of
the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such in33
terception.” In regards to this exception, a “person” is defined to
include an “agent of the United States . . . , any individual, partner34
ship, association, . . . or corporation[.]”
Third, the Wiretap Act has an ISP exception. This exception
makes the warrant requirement of the Wiretap Act inapplicable in
regards to the “intercept[ion], disclos[ure], or use” of an “electronic
communication” by a “provider of [a] wire or electronic communication service . . . engaged in any activity which is a necessary incident
to . . . the protection of the rights or property of the provider of that
35
service . . . .” Basically, this exception gives a service provider the
31
32
33
34
35

18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a).
Id. § 2518(7).
Id. § 2511(2)(c).
Id. § 2510(6).
Id. § 2511(2)(a)(i).
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right “to intercept and monitor [communications] placed over their
36
facilities in order to combat fraud and theft of service.” With that
said, this exception does not allow service providers to engage in un37
limited screening. However, a service provider and its agents can
engage in reasonable screening, which means that a balance is
reached between the service provider’s interests to safeguard its
rights and property, and its users’ right to privacy in their electronic
38
communications.
C. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
FISA governs the process for electronic surveillance of foreign in39
telligence information within the United States. Under FISA, a warrant is required to obtain information through electronic surveillance. FISA provides four distinct definitions of what constitutes
40
“electronic surveillance.” These definitions are as follows:
(1) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance
device of the contents of any wire or radio communication sent by or intended to be received by a particular, known United States person who is
in the United States, if the contents are acquired by intentionally targeting that United States person, under circumstances in which a person has
a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for
law enforcement purposes;
(2) the acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance
device of the contents of any wire communication to or from a person in
the United States, without the consent of any party thereto, if such acquisition occurs in the United States, but does not include the acquisition of
those communications of computer trespassers that would be permissible
under section 2511(2)(i) of Title 18;
....
(4) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device in the United States for monitoring to acquire information,
other than from a wire . . . communication, under circumstances in
which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant
41
would be required for law enforcement purposes.

36
37
38

39
40
41

United States v. Villanueva, 32 F. Supp. 2d 635, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
See United States v. Auler, 539 F.2d 642, 646 (7th Cir. 1976) (“This authority of the telephone company to intercept and disclose wire communications is not unlimited.”).
See United States v. Harvey, 540 F.2d 1345, 1351 (8th Cir. 1976) (“The federal
courts . . . have construed the statute to impose a standard of reasonableness upon the investigating communication carrier.”).
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2006).
Id. § 1801(f)(1)–(4).
Id. § 1801(f)(1)–(2), (4).
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In other words, the government is required to obtain a warrant to
engage in electronic surveillance when it is intentionally targeting a
United States citizen who has a reasonable expectation of privacy; it
acquires communication without the consent of any party; or it obtains information from something other than a wire communication
when an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.
The procedure to get a warrant under FISA requires the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to apply to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (“FISC”) to receive a court order authorizing surveillance
42
of foreign agents. The federal agent applying for a court order only
needs to demonstrate probable cause to believe that the “target of the
electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
43
power,” that “a significant purpose” of the surveillance is “to obtain
foreign intelligence information,” and that appropriate “minimiza44
tion procedures” are in place. The minimization requirement is
implemented to minimize the collection, retention, and dissemina45
tion of information. The agent does not need to demonstrate that
46
the commission of a crime is imminent. However, there is an additional requirement if the target includes United States persons, which
are defined as United States citizens, permanent resident aliens, and
United States corporations. This additional requirement that must
be proven by the federal agent is that “the target knowingly engages
in sabotage or international terrorism or is preparing for such activi47
ties.”
The FISA warrant requirement is also subject to a few exceptions.
The only relevant exception here gives the President authority to engage in electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information without a FISC order when the Attorney General certifies that
there is “no substantial likelihood that the surveillance will acquire
the contents of any communication to which a United States person

42
43

44
45

46
47

Id. § 1805.
Id. § 1804(a)(4)(A). For purposes of FISA, agents of foreign powers include agents of
foreign political organizations and groups engaged in international terrorism, as well as
agents of foreign nations. Id. § 1801(b).
Id. § 1804(a)(5), (7)(B).
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://epic.
org/privacy/terrorism/fisa/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2012) (explaining that “[m]inimization
procedures are designed to prevent the broad power of foreign intelligence gathering
from being used for routine criminal investigations” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Id.
Id.
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is a party,” provided the surveillance is directed solely at communica48
tions among or between foreign powers.
D. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
CALEA was enacted by Congress in 1994 because of law enforcement’s concern that the increased use of digital telephone exchange
49
switches would make tapping phone lines harder or impossible.
Basically, CALEA requires telephone companies to design their networks in a way that makes it easier for the federal government to
conduct criminal investigations using wiretapping of telephone net50
works. The purpose of CALEA is to enhance the ability of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to conduct electronic surveillance
by
requiring
that
telecommunications
carriers
and manufacturers of telecommunications equipment modify and
design their equipment, facilities, and services to ensure that they
have built-in surveillance capabilities, which allow federal agencies to
51
monitor all telephone traffic under certain circumstances.
E. National Security Letters
A National Security Letter (“NSL”) is a type of administrative subpoena that is used by federal agencies to obtain various records and
data pertaining to an individual from a particular entity or organiza52
NSLs can only request non-content information, such as
tion.
transactional records, phone numbers dialed, or e-mail addresses in
53
the “to” or “from” field. An NSL does not have to be supported by
54
probable cause or have judicial oversight.
National Security Letters were first used in 1986 to circumvent the
55
Right to Financial Privacy Act in counterintelligence cases and were
limited to foreign powers or persons who the FBI had reasonable

48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1)(B).
CALEA, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., http://www.eff.org/issues/calea (last visited May
9, 2011).
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1010 (2006).
Id.
National Security Letters, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://epic.org/privacy/nsl/
#overview (last visited May 9, 2011).
Overview: What Does an NSL Do?, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://epic.org/
privacy/nsl/#overview (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
Legal Authority for NSL Power, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://epic.org/privacy/
nsl/#authority (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
Id.
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56

cause to believe were agents of a foreign power. Compliance with
this NSL was voluntary, and state consumer privacy laws usually per57
mitted institutions to decline these requests. This remedy never
58
identified any penalties for failing to comply with an NSL request.
In 1993, restrictions regarding obtaining information from a “foreign
power” were relaxed, and the use of NSLs was expanded to include
any person suspected of communicating with foreign agents regard59
ing espionage or terrorism.
NSLs are different from traditional subpoenas or warrants. First,
they contain a non-disclosure provision. An entity that receives an
NSL is prohibited from disclosing to anyone that they received an
60
NSL or the contents of the NSL. Second, they do not require judicial oversight—the judicial branch is not required to approve the is61
suance of an NSL. This has led to some problems in implementa62
tion, as described later.
II. SURVEILLANCE AFTER 9/11
The events that occurred on September 11, 2001 have greatly impacted the law enforcement landscape of the United States. Since
9/11, the United States has been more aggressively developing policies and using tactics to protect United States citizens from terrorist
attacks and punish those responsible for them. These policies address actual attacks on United States soil or overseas against United
States citizens, the aiding and abetting of terrorist activities, and the
planning of terrorist activities. Many rights and laws that existed
prior to 9/11, such as the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches, the Wiretap Act, FISA, CALEA, and the use of
National Security Letters have been adapted or reinterpreted since
9/11 to accommodate these new policies and tactics.

56
57
58
59
60

61
62

Barton Gellman, The FBI’s Secret Scrutiny, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2005, at A1.
Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 3405 (2006).
Id.
Basic Look at National Security Letters, USA TODAY, Mar. 9, 2007, http://www.usatoday.
com/news/washington/2007-03-09-1844717959_x.htm.
National Security Letters, supra note 52. Following enactment of the PATRIOT Reauthorization Act of 2005, however, entities receiving NSLs may disclose if doing so to seek legal
advice or otherwise comply with the NSL. Id. Various cases, such as Doe v. Holder, 640 F.
Supp. 2d 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), and Doe v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008), have challenged the non-disclosure requirement as unconstitutional, which has resulted in limitations being placed on the non-disclosure requirement.
National Security Letters, supra note 52.
See infra p. 1049.
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A. Fourth Amendment Protection
Although the text of the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution has not been altered, the interpretation of what constitutes a reasonable search and when an exception to the warrant requirement is applicable has been interpreted more broadly since
9/11. For example, during the Bush Administration, President
George W. Bush authorized the warrantless eavesdropping on Americans and others inside the United States to find evidence of terrorist
63
activity. This program included the monitoring of international tel64
ephone calls and international e-mail messages. The Bush administration viewed this behavior as necessary so the federal government
could move quickly to monitor communications that may disclose
65
threats to the United States. Victims of this warrantless surveillance
have attempted to seek redress in federal courts. While most cases
have been dismissed, some cases, such as the case that was formerly
66
known as Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. Bush, have been de67
cided against the United States. However, this pro-plaintiff outcome
is unusual, and Al-Haramain may have turned out differently if it had
been heard in a federal court that tends to favor the government on
68
national security matters.
Although it is hard to prove that the Fourth Amendment has been
interpreted differently since 9/11, Jameel Jaffer, an attorney with the
American Civil Liberties Union, acknowledges that “[i]f you take a
broad look at the big Fourth Amendment cases that have been decided since 9/11 . . . it’s pretty clear that, in applying the ‘reasona-

63

64
65
66
67

68

Bush Administration’s Warrantless Wiretapping Program, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/15/AR2007051500
999.html.
Id.
Id.
507 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 2007).
Kevin Bankston, Court Rejects Government’s Executive Power Claims and Rules That Warrantless
Wiretapping Violated Law, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 31, 2010),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/03/court-rules-warrantless-wiretapping-illegal (last
visited July 24, 2011); Burke Hansen, Bush-Authored Warrantless Wiretapping Suffers Abrupt
Defeat, REGISTER, Apr. 2, 2010, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/04/02/warantless_
wiretapping_defeat/.
Hansen, supra note 67; David Kravets, Feds Appeal Warrantless-Wiretapping Defeat, WIRED:
THREAT LEVEL (Feb. 22, 2011, 4:14 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/
02/feds-appealing-wiretap-defeat/ (acknowledging the oddity of the San Francisco federal judge ruling against the federal government in a national security case).
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bleness’ test, the courts have been more deferential to the executive
69
since 9/11 than they were before 9/11.”
B. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
The Wiretap Act was modified after 9/11 by the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (“PATRIOT”), the
PATRIOT Reauthorization Acts in 2006, and the FISA Amendments
Act of 2008. Most significantly, the PATRIOT Act of 2001 added terrorist and computer crimes to the Wiretap Act’s predicated offense
70
list.
C. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
FISA was also modified after 9/11 by the PATRIOT Act of 2001,
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, and
the FISA Amendments Act of 2008. The PATRIOT Act made a variety of changes to FISA. First, it eased the restrictions on foreign intelligence gathering within the United States. The PATRIOT Act did
this by permitting “roving” surveillance, which allows the interception
of any communications made to or by an intelligence target without
specifying the particular telephone line, computer, or other facility to
71
be monitored. The probable cause standard now requires only that
a significant purpose of surveillance be the gathering of foreign intel72
ligence information, instead of it being the sole or primary purpose.
Second, the United States intelligence community was given greater
access to information discovered during a criminal investigation,
which meant that “the wall” between criminal investigation and intel73
ligence gathering was eliminated. Lastly, the PATRIOT Act prohibits a cause of action in any court against a provider of a wire or electronic communication service, landlord, custodian, or any other
person that furnishes any information, facilities, or technical assistance in accordance with a court order or request for emergency as74
sistance under such Act.

69
70
71
72
73
74

E-mail from Jameel Jaffer, Attorney, Am. Civil Liberties Union, to author (Apr. 6, 2011,
5:48 PM) (on file with author).
PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 814, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 382 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 1030 (2006)).
Id. tit. 2, § 206.
Id. § 218.
Id. § 203(a), (c).
Id. § 225.
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The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
amended the definition of a “foreign power or agent of a foreign
75
power” by adding the “Lone Wolf” Amendment. Under FISA, the
“Lone Wolf” Amendment makes a non-United States person who engages in international terrorism or activities in preparation for international terrorism an “agent of a foreign power” regardless of that
76
individual’s actual status. This Amendment was added to FISA in re77
sponse to the FBI’s failure to prosecute Zacarias Moussaoui. The
FBI and Immigration and Naturalization Service in Minneapolis de78
tained Moussaoui on August 16, 2001 for a visa waiver violation. Although the FBI soon discovered that Moussaoui held jihadist beliefs
and was suspected of being an Islamic extremist, the FBI failed to get
a court order under FISA from the FISC authorizing surveillance because the FBI believed that FISA standards could not be met since the
FBI could not find any evidence that Moussaoui was an agent of a
79
foreign power. However, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, there was speculation that Moussaoui was the missing twentieth
hijacker, and the failure on the part of law enforcement and the intelligence side to fully investigate Moussaoui when he was in FBI cus80
tody prior to the 9/11 attacks became a huge point of criticism. The
United States wanted to ensure that a “lone wolf” would not slip
through the cracks again.
The FISA Amendments of 2008 also made a variety of alterations
to FISA. They allow eavesdropping in emergencies without court approval, provided the government files required papers within a week,
and they expand the range of persons being targeted by warrantless
81
electronic surveillance. Specifically, the Amendments permit the
FISC to have jurisdiction over a United States person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States in order to acquire for82
eign intelligence information.
Finally, the Amendments provide
immunity for any electronic communication service provider that

75
76
77

78
79
80
81
82

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 6001,
118 Stat. 3638, 3742 (2004).
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1) (2006).
See Patricia L. Bellia, The “Lone Wolf” Amendment and the Future of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 50 VILL. L. REV. 425, 426 (2005) (stating that the “Moussaoui episode” prompted the FISA amendment).
Id. at 425.
Id. at 425–26.
Id. at 426.
FISA
Amendments
Act
of
2008,
WALL
ST.
J.,
June
19,
2008,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121391360949290049.html.
Id.
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provides information, facilities, or assistance to the Attorney General
83
and the Director of National Intelligence, in addition to their previous immunities.
D. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
CALEA has been modified post-9/11 as well. The biggest change
occurred in 2004 when CALEA mandates were extended to the In84
ternet. The DOJ, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives (“ATF”), the FBI, and the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) filed a joint petition with the Federal Communications
Commission (“FCC”) to expand their powers to include the ability to
monitor Voice-over-Internet-Protocol (“VoIP”) and broadband Internet communications in order to monitor Web traffic as well as phone
85
calls. The FCC adopted these requests in a “First Report and Or86
der,” which was reaffirmed in 2006 in a “Second Report and Order.”
Furthermore, the role of CALEA has significantly increased.
From 2004 to 2007, there was a 62% growth in the number of wiretaps performed under CALEA and more than a 3000% growth in the
87
interception of digital files, such as e-mail.
E. National Security Letters
As a result of 9/11 and the Bush Administration, the PATRIOT
Act significantly expanded the use of NSLs. For example, the number of NSLs that are issued each year has increased. Now, the FBI is88
sues more than 30,000 NSLs a year. Additionally, NSLs are now
used to scrutinize United States citizens, residents, or visitors who are
89
not suspected to be part of any criminal investigation.
NSLs do have their limitations. For example, they cannot be utilized as a way to eavesdrop or read the contents of e-mail. However,
since 9/11 NSLs have allowed investigators to “obtain sensitive information such as the web sites a person visits, a list of e-mail addresses with which a person has corresponded, or even unmask the
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

Id.
CALEA FAQ, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION, (Mar. 5, 2012), https://www.eff.org/
pages/calea-faq.
Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), FED. COMMS. COMMISSION
(Feb. 21, 2007), http://www.fcc.gov/calea/.
Id.
Ryan Singel, Point, Click . . . Eavesdrop: How the FBI Wiretap Net Operates, WIRED (Aug. 29,
2007), http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2007/08/wiretap?currentPage=3.
Gellman, supra note 56.
Id.
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identity of a person who has posted anonymous speech on a political
90
website.”
III.

SURVEILLANCE IN THE VIRTUAL WORLD

The virtual world is a three-dimensional computer-generated por91
Virtual
trayal of the real world but existing only in cyberspace.
worlds are set up just like the real world—“users will find the sun,
wind, buildings, paved streets, grass, rivers, seas, mountains, islands,
and countries, all recreated to look and ‘feel’ as if users were actually
92
living in cyber reality.”
Originally, virtual worlds were just massive multiplayer online role93
playing games, or MMORPGs, where a user creates a character to
94
represent himself, which is known as an “avatar.” An avatar does not
have to be an exact replication of a user, and a user’s avatar can take
95
on different and new roles in the virtual world.
However, as time has passed, virtual worlds have become more
96
than just a game. As in the real world, users can go to work, con97
duct business, attend virtual churches, and join virtual societies. Virtual worlds have become so popular that about 20 to 30 million users
actually “spend” more time in virtual worlds than they do in the real
98
world. These worlds are becoming more than a world of makebelieve. “[R]eal-life corporations, universities, government agencies,
and medical centers are venturing into virtual worlds to hold classes,
99
conduct research, and provide training.” Now, virtual worlds are
100
even being used to train soldiers.

90
91
92

93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

National Security Letters, ACLU (Jan. 10, 2011), http://www.aclu.org/national-securitytechnology-and-liberty/national-security-letters.
See THE STATE OF PLAY: LAW, GAMES, AND VIRTUAL WORLDS 3 (Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck eds., 2006).
Bettina M. Chin, Regulating Your Second Life: Defamation in Virtual Worlds, 72 BROOK. L.
REV. 1303, 1303 (2007). “[Second Life] is ostensibly a free-range graphical environment
where users may explore, interact, create, and trade as they do in real life—only this happens, of course, in a ‘second life.’” Id. at 1304.
EDWARD CASTRONOVA, SYNTHETIC WORLDS: THE BUSINESS AND CULTURE OF ONLINE
GAMES 9 (2005).
THE STATE OF PLAY, supra note 91, at 15.
See id.
See id. at 16.
See id. at 15.
See id. at 16.
Chuleenan Svetvilas, Real Law in the Virtual World, CAL. LAW. (Jan. 2008),
http://www.callawyer.com/clstory.cfm?pubdt=NaN&eid=890855&evid=1.
See THE STATE OF PLAY, supra note 91.
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Along with all the benefits that virtual worlds provide, the use of
virtual worlds can also cause problems. The main concern regarding
virtual worlds has been expressed by intelligence officials who have
examined virtual world systems and are convinced that “the qualities
that many computer users find so attractive about virtual worlds—
including anonymity, global access and the expanded ability to make
financial transfers outside normal channels—have turned them into
101
seedbeds for transnational threats.”
“Unfortunately, what started
out as a benign environment where people would congregate to
share information or explore fantasy worlds is now offering the opportunity for religious/political extremists to recruit, rehearse, transfer money, and ultimately engage in information warfare or worse
102
with impunity.”
This concern that virtual worlds will be used as the next terrorist
battlefield raises issues regarding the proper limits that need to be
placed on the government’s quest to improve security through data
collection and analysis and the surveillance of commercial computer
systems. The following evaluation of monitoring virtual worlds in relation to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
the Wiretap Act, FISA, CALEA, and the use of National Security Letters will hopefully shed some light on this growing area of concern.
A. Statutory Application
1. Fourth Amendment Protection
An important consideration is whether the Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable searches also applies to conduct in
the virtual world. One argument is that if virtual world technology is
intentionally designed to make humans act as though the virtual
world is in some respects real, then the law ought to respect privacy
expectations as it does in real life. If so, then if an avatar is out at a
shopping mall or driving a car in the virtual world, this conduct
would be considered public and no reasonable expectation of privacy
would exist (in that virtual world). Contrastingly, if an avatar was engaging in activity within his virtual home, than this would be considered private conduct protected from unwanted intrusion.

101

102

Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Spies’ Battleground Turns Virtual, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2008,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2008/02/05/AR200802050314
4.html?sub=AR.
Id.
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Under this line of thinking, just like in the real world, any search
would be subject to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement and
would be considered unreasonable without a warrant. However, the
same exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as consent to be
searched, exigent circumstances, and evidence located in plain view,
would apply. For example, if an individual entering the virtual world
is notified that his virtual conduct is monitored and the individual
agrees, then just like in real life, there is no reasonable expectation of
privacy and the avatar’s conduct can be monitored. Arguably, the virtual world is a recognized public community; therefore, whoever develops an avatar voluntarily and knowingly agrees to live and play in
this public community, thereby eliminating any reasonable expectation of privacy. Furthermore, some virtual worlds, such as Second
103
Life, include a privacy statement in its “Community Standards.”
This statement explains that Residents are entitled to a reasonable
104
level of privacy with regard to their Second Lives. This means that
sharing personal information about a fellow Resident—including
gender, religion, age, marital status, race, sexual preference, and realworld location beyond what is provided by the Resident in the First
Life page of their Resident profile—is a violation of that Resident’s
105
privacy. Also, remotely monitoring conversations, posting conversation logs, or sharing conversation logs without consent are all prohi106
bited in Second Life and on the Second Life Forums. However, if a
person voluntarily shares this information, then there is no reasona107
ble expectation of privacy.
Another exception that may apply to the virtual world could be an
exigent circumstance. An exigent circumstance is an emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a
suspect or destruction of evidence. There is no standard test for determining whether such circumstances exist, and in each case the extraordinary situation must be measured by the facts known by offi108
cials.
However, these circumstances would cause a reasonable
103
104
105
106
107

108

Community Standards, SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com/corporate/cs.php (last visited
Feb. 20, 2012).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Privacy Policy, SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com/corporate/privacy.php#privacy1
(last visited Feb. 18, 2012) (stating that personal information disclosed while using
Second Life “is public information and [the user] should not expect privacy or confidentiality of this information”).
People v. Ramey, 545 P.2d 1333, 1341 (Cal. 1976).
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person to believe that entry (or other relevant prompt action) was
necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons,
the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of a suspect, or some
other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforce109
ment efforts.
Exigency may be determined by a variety of factors,
such as the degree of urgency involved, the amount of time needed
to get a warrant, whether evidence is about to be removed or de110
stroyed, and/or ready destructibility of the evidence.
Information
in the virtual world can easily be deleted and/or encrypted to prevent
or greatly hinder understanding of it. Because of this, obtaining a
warrant may not be possible before evidence is lost forever, so the
government or an internal overseer of the virtual world should be allowed to retrieve or monitor information about an avatar’s behavior
and activities.
Lastly, the plain view doctrine may apply in the virtual world as
well. The real world plain view doctrine requires that three factors
must be satisfied: (1) the officer has to be lawfully present at the
place where the evidence can be plainly viewed; (2) the officer has to
have a lawful right of access to the object; (3) the incriminating cha111
racter of the object has to be “immediately apparent.” This test can
also be applied to the virtual world. An overseer, such as Linden Lab,
an ISP, or the government is allowed to monitor conduct in the virtual world if the conduct is illegal. Both Linden Lab and an ISP are
lawfully present through a contract, such as the Terms of Service, that
a user of the virtual world agrees to upon signing up with the ser112
vice.
The government is lawfully present due to the fact that the
conduct is illegal. Therefore, the first requirement of lawful presence
113
would be satisfied.
Obtaining a warrant could also satisfy the requirement of being lawfully present. Second, upon being lawfully
present, if Linden Lab, an ISP, or the government sees terrorist plans
or weapons that are left out in the open in the virtual world, like on a
table or on the floor, then the second prong would be satisfied.
Third, possessing terrorist plans and weapons, such as bombs, although in the virtual world, is still incriminating because its illegality
is immediately apparent. Therefore, if these three elements are satis-

109
110
111
112

113

United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir. 1984).
United States v. Reed, 935 F. 2d 641, 642 (4th Cir. 1991).
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136–37 (1990).
Terms of Service, SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com/corporate/tos.php?lang=en-US#tos8
(last visited Feb. 20, 2012) (stating that posting, displaying, or transmitting illegal content
is not permitted and will be reported to the authorities).
Horton, 496 U.S. at 136–37.
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fied, then the plain view exception would apply, and there would be
no reasonable expectation of privacy in this behavior. Based on this
analysis, if a virtual terrorist cell is raided or searched, then this evidence could be seized.
The third element of the plain view doctrine—the incriminating
nature must be immediately apparent—may be the hardest to prove.
This is because the illegality of conduct, such as possessing terrorist
plans or weapons, which occurs in the virtual world, may not be as
apparent as it would be in the real world. Conduct in the virtual
world could be considered mere thoughts, and it is hard to hold
someone accountable for their thoughts.
However, in the real world, an individual can be held accountable
for illegal conduct even if the conduct was never achieved. According to the Model Penal Code, a person is guilty of an attempt to
commit a crime if an individual “purposely does or omits to do anything that, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is an
act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct
114
planned to culminate in his commission of the crime.”
With that
said, possessing terrorist plans on its own may not be enough to constitute a substantial step to commit a terrorist act in the real world.
However, possessing terrorist plans as well as possessing weapons to
carry out a terrorist act in the real world without actually carrying out
the act could amount to a substantial step in furtherance of the unlawful conduct. This conduct could result in an individual being
prosecuted for an attempt to commit a crime under the criminal
115
law.
With this understanding of criminal attempt law, conduct that
may be considered mere thoughts in the virtual world could be evaluated similarly to conduct in the real world that falls under criminal
attempt law. Drawing this similarity to criminal attempt law in the
real world would allow for the illegality of conduct in the virtual
world to be immediately apparent in some situations. For example,
just possessing terrorist plans or just possessing weapons on their own
in the virtual world, as in the real world, is arguably not enough to
prove that the illegality of this conduct is immediately apparent.
However, it is possible that these actions taken in the aggregate,
meaning possessing both weapons and a terrorist plan, could amount
to conduct where the illegality is immediately apparent. This is be-

114
115

MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (1980).
This Article does not discuss whether conspiracy or attempt law is applicable in the virtual
world.
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cause a single thought in the virtual world could be seen as unimportant, but multiple thoughts about engaging in a common criminal activity, such as engaging in a terrorist activity, could be seen as a substantial step making the illegality of this conduct immediately
apparent. Therefore, in order for the third element to be satisfied in
the plain view doctrine, an avatar would need to possess both virtual
terrorist plans and weapons, or a combination of other conduct relating to engaging in a terrorist activity, in the virtual world.
Another argument is that the virtual world is not real, so there is
no reasonable expectation of privacy in anything that occurs in it.
This means that there is no Fourth Amendment protection. Virtual
worlds are fictitious worlds where users voluntarily enter for fun and
games. They are open spaces intended for its users to inhabit and interact via avatars. Anyone is welcomed in—all you need is a membership. Basically, the virtual world is a public sphere, like a community.
Because of this, an individual may not find surveillance in a virtual
world offensive. Furthermore, courts have not found a reasonable
expectation of privacy in “matters which occur in a public place or a
116
place otherwise open to the public . . . .”
Therefore, if a virtual
world is considered a public space (and it is certainly open to the
public because anyone can create and maintain an avatar), then
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in conduct that occurs
in the virtual world.
2. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act
Another important consideration is whether the Wiretap Act applies to conduct that occurs in the virtual world. As mentioned previously, the Wiretap Act: (1) prohibits the unauthorized, nonconsen117
sual interception of “wire, oral, or electronic communications” by
government agencies as well as private parties; (2) establishes procedures for obtaining warrants to authorize wiretapping by government
officials; and (3) regulates the disclosure and use of authorized intercepted communications by investigative and law enforcement officers.
Communication that takes place in the virtual world occurs over a
wire or electronically; therefore, communication among avatars in
the virtual world would be protected from government surveillance
116
117

Fogel v. Forbes, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 1081, 1087 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
Electronic communications were added by Title I of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act in 1986. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, tit.
1, §§ 101(c)(2), 110(b), 100 Stat. 1851, 1859 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006)).
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under the Wiretap Act unless there were an applicable exception. As
previously discussed, the Wiretap Act has three applicable exceptions,
which can be used to monitor communications in a virtual world absent a warrant. These exceptions are: (1) exigent circumstances; (2)
consent to be monitored; and (3) the provider exception.
First, the exigent circumstances exception applies when a federal
agent, who has been designated by someone like the Attorney General, “reasonably determines that . . . an emergency situation exists that
involves—(i) immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to
any person [or] (ii) conspiratorial activities threatening the national
security interest . . . that requires a wire, oral, or electronic communication to be intercepted before an order authorizing such intercep118
tion” can be obtained. Virtual world conduct that is most likely to
fall under this exception would be preparatory actions leading up to
a terrorist activity because this behavior would constitute “conspira119
torial activities threatening the national security interest.”
This
conduct may include the recruitment of terrorists or the communication among terrorists within the virtual world. Therefore, obtaining a
warrant to monitor communications occurring in the virtual world
under these circumstances would not be required.
Second, the consent exception to the Wiretap Act applies either
when an individual, acting under color of law, is a party to the communication or one of the parties consents to have the communication monitored. This analysis is similar to the consent exception
analysis under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitu120
tion.
If an individual who enters the virtual world is notified that
his virtual conduct is monitored and that individual agrees, then just
like in real life, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy and the
avatar’s conduct can be monitored.
However, the owners of Second Life, Linden Lab, can disclose a
user’s personal or other account-related information under limited
121
circumstances.
For example, Linden Lab can share information
“[i]n order to report to law enforcement authorities, or assist in their
investigation of, suspected illegal or wrongful activity, or to report any
122
instance in which we believe a person may be in danger[.]” Therefore, by creating an avatar and knowingly and voluntarily agreeing to
a virtual world’s privacy statement and user agreement, a user has
118
119
120
121
122

Id. § 2518(7).
Id.
See HARR & HESS, supra note 19, at 219.
Privacy Policy, supra note 107.
Id.
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consented to abide by that virtual world’s rules, which may include
mandatory reporting of illegal conduct or permitting law enforcement to monitor users if illegal conduct occurs.
Lastly, the provider exception allows a provider of a wire or electronic communication to intercept, disclose, or use any electronic
communication if engaged in conduct that is necessarily incident to
protecting the rights or property of that service provider. First, a virtual world needs to be a provider of a wire or electronic communication. Virtual worlds, such as Second Life, permit users to post, display, or transmit content throughout the virtual world through a
123
network infrastructure.
Therefore, a virtual world that engages in
this type of conduct would be a provider of wire or electronic communication. Second, a virtual world’s conduct must protect its own
124
rights or property, and not the rights of a third party.
Virtual
worlds have an interest in protecting themselves from users who engage in illegal conduct, such as terrorist activity, and destroy the
tranquility of the virtual world. If virtual worlds become a haven for
illegal conduct, then law-abiding users may stop paying for accounts,
and, as a result, the virtual worlds may have to shut down. For these
reasons, the provider exception could permit virtual worlds to intercept, disclose, and use electronic communication without a warrant.
3. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
An additional issue to consider is whether FISA applies to actions
taken in the virtual world. A FISA warrant is required when dealing
with the electronic surveillance of foreign intelligence information.
In order to obtain a court order authorizing surveillance, FISA’s
probable cause standard has to be satisfied. This requires first that a
federal agent demonstrate that there is probable cause to believe that
the target of the surveillance is a foreign power, agent of a foreign
power, or a non-United States individual who is engaged in terrorist
conduct; and second, that the significant purpose of the surveillance
is to obtain foreign intelligence information. Therefore, for federal
agents to obtain a FISA warrant to engage in electronic surveillance
123
124

Terms of Service, supra note 112.
See, e.g., Campiti v. Walonis, 611 F.2d 387, 393 (1st Cir. 1979) (explaining that the provider exception does not apply to a person who is not an agent of the telephone company
for monitoring that “had nothing to do with telephone company equipment or rights”);
United States v. Auler, 539 F.2d 642, 645–46 (7th Cir. 1976) (discussing how telephone
companies that intercept communications under 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) can share
those communications with the federal government only to the degree necessary to protect the telephone company’s rights or property).
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they would need to show that the virtual world user is a foreign power, agent of a foreign power, or a non-United States individual who is
engaged in terrorist conduct. This can be done by finding the subscriber’s real world information, such as name, address, and telephone number, through the records held by service providers located
in the real world. This information alone may not be enough to satisfy the first prong of the FISA probable cause standard because the information may not link to an actual person or a hacker could have
hacked into an innocent user’s account. However, once a user’s
name is identified, then this information could be used by federal
agents to cross-match it with lists of known terrorists in the real world
to see if the name is one of a known terrorist.
On the other hand, it may be easier to satisfy the second prong
because to find a significant purpose an agent does not have to demonstrate that the commission of a crime is imminent, just that the
significant purpose for obtaining a warrant is to gather foreign intelligence information. This foreign intelligence information can be
found through online conversations among virtual world avatars, online postings in the virtual world, or conduct engaged in by avatars in
the virtual world. Since no evidence of an actual crime needs to be
proven, this makes satisfying the significant purpose test easier because the analysis of whether a virtual world crime can be prosecuted
in real world courts is avoided.
FISA has a variety of definitions as to what conduct constitutes
electronic surveillance requiring a warrant. The provisions that may
be applicable here are 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(1), (2), and (4); however,
monitoring conduct in a virtual world falls outside the scope of these
provisions. In regards to § 1801(f)(1), agents can target a specific
United States person within the United States, and if a reasonable
expectation of privacy existed, then a warrant would be required to
monitor communications. However, it can be argued that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in a virtual world because an individual who enters the virtual world is notified that his virtual conduct
can be monitored in limited circumstances and if that individual
agrees to the terms of use, then just like in real life, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy, and the avatar’s conduct can be monitored in these limited circumstances. Second Life, in its Terms of
Use, lists one such limited circumstance to be assistance in a law enforcement investigation. Therefore, monitoring virtual world conduct may be outside the scope of FISA § 1801(f)(1), and a FISA order
would not need to be obtained to monitor virtual world conduct if a
user provides consent.
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FISA § 1801(f)(2) pertains to obtaining the contents of wire
communications without the consent of any party involved. Virtual
worlds that have Terms of Use and/or Privacy Statements require
their users to voluntarily and knowingly consent to be monitored in
limited circumstances. Since users have to agree to the terms in order to use the services of the virtual world, § 1801(f)(2) also does not
apply to the surveillance of conduct in the virtual worlds.
Moreover, § 1801(f)(4) also prohibits surveillance when there is a
reasonable expectation of privacy. However, as previously discussed,
as long as virtual worlds in their Terms of Use and/or Privacy Policy
state that users’ conduct is subject to be monitored in limited circumstances, then users of a virtual world have no reasonable expectation of privacy in conduct that falls within those limited circumstances. Therefore, monitoring conduct in virtual worlds falls outside
the scope of § 1801(f)(4) as well.
Even if monitoring conduct in the virtual world fell within the
scope of 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(1), (2), or (4), there is an exception to
obtaining a FISA order that would be applicable in this situation.
This exception, as discussed earlier, gives the President the authority
to engage in electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence
information when there is no substantial likelihood that the surveillance will obtain communications to which a United States person is a
party; the surveillance must be directed at communications among or
between foreign powers. Therefore, as long as it can be proven that
the avatars being monitored in the virtual world are agents of a foreign power, then the communications can be monitored without a
warrant. This information can possibly be obtained by gaining access
to subscriber information from the virtual world host.
Lastly, if monitoring conduct in the virtual world fell within the
scope of 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(1), (2), or (4), yet the exception discussed above did not apply, then roving surveillance could be used.
This is because due to the anonymity of the Internet and virtual
worlds, it may be hard for federal agents to identify with precision the
individual that they want to monitor. Under FISA, roving surveillance provides a federal agent with the flexibility to intercept communications made to or by an intelligence target without specifying
the particular computer to be monitored.
4. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act
It is also important to determine how CALEA applies to conduct
in the virtual world. Since CALEA has been extended to the Internet,
service providers are expected to work with law enforcement and in-
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telligence agents to make monitoring Internet traffic easier. As discussed earlier, a virtual world owner can be categorized as a service
provider because it is a network infrastructure that provides connectivity to the Internet that permits its users to communicate through
125
chat, e-mails, and posts. Therefore, requiring virtual worlds to follow CALEA mandates would actually make it easier to monitor conduct in the virtual world.
5. National Security Letters
Lastly, NSLs may be used to obtain information about conduct
that occurs in the virtual world. As mentioned above, NSLs have
been used by investigators to reveal the identity of a person who has
posted anonymous speech on a political website. Therefore, NSLs
can be used to unmask the identity of users in the virtual world. Because a user in the virtual world acts anonymously through an avatar,
if the avatar’s conduct relates to something political, such as terrorism, an NSL can be used as a way to obtain a user’s subscription information from the virtual world host. The use of an NSL could be
instead of, or to supplement, a subpoena because obtaining an NSL is
much easier than obtaining a traditional subpoena.
It is important to note that NSLs have been criticized by a variety
of organizations, such as the ACLU, due to their increased usage and
126
abuse by the FBI as a result of the PATRIOT Act. The ACLU has
challenged this increased use of NSLs in three court cases—Doe v.
127
128
Holder, Library Connection v. Gonzales, and Internet Archive v. Muka129
These cases found that in part or in whole the issuance of an
sey.
130
Therefore, the further expansion of
NSL was unconstitutional.
NSLs to the virtual world may be problematic.
B. Virtual Terrorist Conduct
There has been some growing concern that virtual worlds are actually being used by terrorist organizations to launder money, recruit,

125
126

127
128
129
130

See supra pp. 1056-57.
See National Security Letters, ACLU (Jan. 10, 2011), http://www.aclu.org/national-securitytechnology-and-liberty/national-security-letters (describing the ACLU’s challenges to the
PATRIOT Act and requests for information about the government’s use of NSLs).
640 F. Supp. 2d 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Library Connection v. Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66 (Conn. 2005).
Internet Archive v. Mukasey, No. 07-6346-CW (N.D. Cal. 2008); see National Security Letters,
supra note 126.
Id.

Mar. 2012]

TERRORISM IN THE VIRTUAL WORLD

1061

communicate, and engage in virtual world terrorism. For example,
Canadian Botnet Analysis Report describes a “dark universe” where
“[v]irtual world terrorism facilitates real world terrorism: recruitment, training, communication, radicalization, propagation of toxic
content, fund raising and money laundering, and influence opera131
tions” within online games. The few examples and general understandings of this “dark universe” are described below.
1. Money Laundering
There are concerns regarding the terrorists’ ability to take advantage of challenges in policing the movement of virtual currency, such
as Linden dollars, through the transferring of funds between opera132
tives around the world.
United States intelligence officials have
been cautioning owners of virtual worlds that their programs may be
creating security vulnerabilities for terrorists and criminals to move
133
money, organize, and conduct corporate espionage.
Although virtual owners in the United States have only been cautioned about these concerns, other online companies have already
been victims of money laundering schemes. For example, recently
“authorities in New York . . . charged more than 60 individuals—and
arrested 20—in connection with international cyber heists perpe134
trated against dozens of companies in the United States . . . .” The
cyber criminals used a program to hack into the company’s online
135
banking webpages and steal passwords. This resulted in more than
$800,000 being laundered and sent to the attackers in Eastern Eu136
rope. The investigation into this cyber crime and the takedown operation included efforts from a variety of entities—the U.S. Attorney’s
Office for the Southern District of New York, the FBI, the NYPD, the
Department of State Diplomatic Security Service, the New York Office

131

132
133
134

135
136

COMBATING ROBOT NETWORKS AND THEIR CONTROLLERS: A STUDY FOR THE PUBLIC
SECURITY AND TECHNICAL PROGRAM, BOTNET ANALYSIS, 112 (version 2.0 May 6, 2010),
available
at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/51938416/Botnet-Analysis-Report-FinalUnclassified-v2-0.
Chris Gourlay & Abul Taher, Virtual Jihad Hits Second Life Website, SUNDAY TIMES, Aug. 5,
2007, at 4.
O’Harrow, Jr., supra note 101.
Brian Krebs, U.S. Charges 37 Alleged Money Mules, KREBS ON SECURITY (Sept. 30, 2010, 7:46
PM), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2010/09/u-s-charges-37-alleged-money-mules/#more5470.
Id.
Id.
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of Homeland Security Investigation, and the U.S. Secret Service.
Manhattan U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara was quoted saying that these
arrests show [that] the modern, high-tech bank heist does not require a
gun, a mask, a note, or a getaway car. It requires only the Internet and
ingenuity . . . . And it can be accomplished in the blink of an eye, with
just a click of the mouse. [However, this] coordinated operation demonstrates that these 21st Century bank robbers are not completely anonymous; they are not invulnerable. Working with our colleagues here and
abroad, we will continue to attack this threat, and bring cyber criminals
138
to justice.

It is clear that the United States is taking these online moneylaundering schemes very seriously. Hopefully, if virtual world owners
become the next target, the techniques used to take down cyber criminals in the above-mentioned plot could easily be employed and effective in virtual worlds.
Even though owners of virtual worlds in the United States have
not yet been impacted by money laundering schemes, a variety of
countries abroad have been affected. For example, the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency had to handle a money laundering situation in
139
the virtual world.
A group of Chinese and Korean criminals defrauded Korean gamers and laundered funds through a number of
140
business front companies back to mainland China.
2. Recruitment or Communication via Virtual World
There is suspicion that Islamic militants are using or have used
141
Second Life to recruit individuals to engage in terrorist conduct.
The head of the Australian government’s High Tech Crime Centre,
Kevin Zuccato, said that “jihadists may also be using the virtual reality
142
world to master skills such as reconnaissance and surveillance.”
The virtual world is being used politically to gather support for
different political campaigns. For example, during the most recent
elections in Spain, most politicians had established a virtual presence
143
in Second Life.
Some politicians had even established their own
137
138
139

140
141
142
143

Id.
Id.
Marc Goodman, Crime and Policing in Virtual Worlds, FREEDOM FROM FEAR MAGAZINE,
http://www.freedomfromfearmagazine.org/index.php?option=com_content&
view=article&id=316:crime-and-policing-in-virtual-worlds&catid=50:issue-7&Itemid= (last
visited Feb. 18, 2012).
Id.
Gourlay & Taher, supra note 132, at 4.
Id.
Goodman, supra note 139.
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avatars, which in turn campaigned, held rallies, and put up election
144
posters in virtual spaces. Additionally, during a recent political rally
in the virtual world by a far-right French politician, his posters were
defaced, he had “exploding [virtual] pigs” hurled at him, and Nazi
145
swastikas were painted on campaign headquarters.
3. Virtual World Terrorism
146

World of Warcraft has a history of in-game terrorist activity. In
the past, players would find a curse in a high-level dungeon that
147
would turn them into living bombs.
“They would then teleport to
major cities and detonate themselves, killing nearby players. These
suicide bombers gradually began to target areas where a large num148
ber of players gathered, usually at auction houses or banks.” These
attacks started to occur with so much frequency that some users be149
gan to avoid dangerous cities.
Moreover, a “[v]irtual bioterrorist Allen and his guild, domus
fulminata,” used a comparable teleportation method to spread an ep150
idemic throughout in-game virtual cities. Allen and his guild used a
151
contagious curse called “Corrupted Blood.”
This curse had the
ability to kill most players in seconds or to purposely infect other
152
Allen’s conduct displayed telltale signs of terrorism beplayers.
cause the group strategically blended in with the general population
of the virtual world and preyed on weaknesses in the system in order
153
to carry out an effective attack.
Furthermore, an anonymous intelligence official confirms that
some computer users have used their avatars to destroy virtual build-

144
145

146

147
148
149
150
151
152
153

Id.
Oliver Burkeman, Exploding Pigs and Volleys of Gunfire as Le Pen Opens HQ in Virtual World,
GUARDIAN, Jan. 19, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2007/jan/20/news.fra
nce (explaining that Marie Le Pen was the first European political party to open headquarters within Second Life, a virtual reality website, and her virtual campaign has incited
a remarkable response from protesters).
See David Thier, World of Warcraft Shines Light on Terror Tactics, WIRED (Mar. 20, 2008),
http://www.wired.com/gaming/virtualworlds/news/2008/03/wow_terror
(describing
games that incorporate terrorist themes and actions that serve as “an invaluable tool not
only for counterterrorists and epidemiologists but also sociologists and economists”).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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154

ings, which can be seen in some contexts as an act of terrorism in
the virtual world.
C. How to Locate Terrorists in the Virtual World
Is it possible to attribute a real world terrorist attack to an organization that developed in the virtual world? If identification information matches between the avatar and the individual, the virtual plans
can be used as evidence to show intent, knowledge, and guilt. However, attribution may be an issue, and this may be easier said than
155
done.
Prosecution of individuals who have committed online offenses
requires evidence that a crime was committed and of who committed
the crime. A way to prove the identity of an anonymous online offender is to obtain the identity of subscribers, such as name, address,
and telephone number, through the records held by service providers located in the real world. Virtual worlds, such as Second Life, require that the information provided by a user to create an account be
“accurate, current and complete information about [one]self as
prompted by the registration form (‘Registration Data’) and [that the
user] use the account management tools provided to
156
keep . . . Registration Data accurate, current and complete.”
This
information can be obtained through subpoenas, for example to
Linden Lab directly if dealing with a situation occurring in Second
Life, to ISPs, or to PayPal. This disclosure of information is permissible because individuals who enter the virtual world generally sign an
agreement allowing the owners of the online world to provide the
government with information about its users under certain circumstances, such as in the case of a lawful investigation. For example, the
government retains the power to ensure that networks of Linden Lab,
which is the owner of Second Life, are “intercept-capable” and have
157
data retention for a particular period.
154
155

156

157

O’Harrow, Jr., supra note 101.
See generally Charles L. Glaser, Deterrence of Cyber Attacks and U.S. National Security 3 (George
Washington Univ. Cyber Security Policy & Research Inst. Report GW-CSPRI-2011-5, June
1, 2011), available at http://www.cspri.seas.gwu.edu/seminar2010_2011.html (describing
the various reasons and challenges for erecting government-supported defenses and deterrences to cyber attacks).
See Terms of Service, supra note 112 (describing the terms under which “Linden Research,
Inc. and Linden Research United Kingdom, Ltd. (collectively ‘Linden Lab’) offer [users]
access to Second Life”).
See generally Sara M. Smyth, Back to the Future: Crime and Punishment in Second Life, 36
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 18, 42 (2009) (referring to Second Life’s policy in 2009,
but it is important to note that the government was given this authority).
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Furthermore, the government can also require that the service
agreement between Linden Lab and its users be drafted in such a way
as to make it easier for the company to monitor and control illegal
158
conduct by its users.
This might include the reporting of illegal
content, as is already required with respect to all ISPs in cases of on159
Illegal content may also include terrorist
line child pornography.
plans. If this is true, then the owner of a virtual world that is being
used as a breeding ground for virtual terrorist cells may also be required to report this conduct.
Scientists have proposed another way to identify the user behind
an avatar without obtaining a court order or intercepting online
communication. Researchers believe that the faces and behavior of
avatars could help identify the user, and by “monitoring for signature
gestures, movements and other distinguishing characteristics,” a behavioral analysis could help determine whether an avatar has been
160
hacked and stolen or is under the control of its owner. This work is
very preliminary, but the researchers involved are confident about
161
the results because “[s]o far [they] have been very successful.”
Therefore, the attribution issue may be closer to being solved.
With that said, finding ways to locate terrorist activity in the virtual
world and then reporting it may be challenging. However, “spy avatars” or “undercover avatars” could be used. In the real world, law
enforcement agencies use agents to go undercover in online chat
rooms to pretend to be underage children as a way to catch adults
who are posing as children. These agents go undercover in order to
catch adults who are trying to set up meeting times with children to
engage in sexual activity and child pornography. Real world law enforcement agents also infiltrate drug rings and terrorist cells by having agents pretend to work for the drug lords or terrorist groups. In
actuality, they are working undercover in order to monitor and obtain evidence of illegal conduct. Similarly, in the virtual world, an
employee of Linden Lab, an ISP, or the government could make an
avatar and go undercover befriending other avatars and possibly becoming part of a virtual terrorist cell in order to obtain evidence that
158
159

160
161

Id.
See 42 U.S.C. § 13031 (2006) (describing the requirement to “make a report of
the suspected abuse to the agency designated . . . to take emergency action to protect the
child”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 13032 (imposing the duty to report any knowledge of facts or
circumstances involving child pornography on all who are engaged in providing an electronic communication service or remote computing service to the public).
Virtual People to Get ID Checks, BBC NEWS (July 28, 2011, 8:12 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/technology-14277728.
Id. (quoting Dr. Yampolskiy, a researcher from the University of Louisville).
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terrorist activity is occurring in the virtual world. Once the undercover avatar becomes part of a virtual terrorist cell, it would be easier
to monitor the cell’s current and future conduct. This solution may
be costly; however, existing employees can be the ones who make spy
avatars, so no extra money would be expended to hire additional personnel.
D. Obtaining Evidence in the Virtual World
As discussed earlier, to obtain a criminal warrant under the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or under the
Wiretap Act, a federal agent must prove that under the circumstances
known to him or her there is a reasonable belief that a person has
162
committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. Also, as
previously mentioned, the FISA probable cause standard to obtain a
warrant is slightly different. In actuality, the standard for obtaining a
FISA wiretap warrant is lower than the standard for getting a criminal
wiretap warrant. Under FISA, there needs to be a finding of probable
cause that the surveillance target is a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power, irrespective of whether the target is suspected of en163
gaging in criminal activity.
There is also an additional element if
164
The federal agent then also
the target is a United States person.
has to prove that the target knowingly engages in sabotage or interna165
tional terrorism or is preparing for such activities.
Should the virtual world be subjected to the probable cause standard of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and the Wiretap Act or FISA probable cause standard? Do you need
to have a reasonable belief that an avatar’s conduct in the virtual
world is going to correlate to a crime being committed in the real
world? If a reasonable suspicion standard is followed instead of a reasonable belief standard (due to the arguably reduced privacy in a virtual world because it is a public space), then reasonable suspicion requires specific and articulable facts taken together to form rational
166
inferences from those facts. If a warrant is even necessary to obtain
evidence from a virtual world, this standard would be easier to satisfy
162
163
164
165
166

See United States v. Puerta, 982 F.2d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating the test for probable cause for a warrant).
See supra Part II.C.
Id.
See id.
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (“[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together
with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”).
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because any evidence that an avatar is acting individually or meeting
with other avatars to commit a terrorist act could be used to obtain a
warrant. Evidence like hosting group meetings in secret locations in
the virtual world, speaking a secret language in the virtual world, collecting virtual money, or carrying out terrorist activity within the virtual world itself arguably could be used to form a rational inference
that these avatars are organizing to commit or are committing terrorist activities in the real world.
E. Prosecuting Virtual Crimes
1. Elements of a Crime
Criminal activity consists of four elements that must be satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) prohibited conduct (actus reus); (2)
culpable mental state (mens rea); (3) specified attendant circums167
tances; and (4) a forbidden result or harm.
In order for an individual to be prosecuted for a crime, these four elements must be satisfied.
In order to be prosecuted for an activity in the virtual world, the
virtual activity must consist of, or involve, conduct that would constitute a crime in the real world. If there are no real world consequences, then the crime is a fantasy crime, which cannot be prose168
cuted.
Unless the criminal code is modified to accommodate virtual
crimes, criminal activity in the virtual world has to satisfy the same
four elements as criminal conduct in the real world. First, the actus
reus is present when the perpetrator commits an illegal act. This
conduct can occur wholly in the real world, wholly in the virtual
169
world, or partially in both worlds. The illegality of the act is what is
170
Second, the mens rea is
important, not where the act occurred.
present when the perpetrator knew that the illegal conduct was in
fact illegal. It is important to note that the mens rea of the perpetra167

168

169
170

See generally Susan W. Brenner, Is There Such a Thing as “Virtual Crime”?, 4 CAL. CRIM. L.
REV. 1, ¶ 33 (2001), available at http://boalt.org/CCLR/v4/v4brenner.htm [hereinafter
Virtual Crime] (“[W]e define crimes as consisting [of] four elements: prohibited conduct,
culpable mental state, specified attendant circumstances and a forbidden result or harm.
These elements are the method we use to impose liability for the commission of crimes.”
(footnote omitted)).
See generally, Susan W. Brenner, Fantasy Crime: The Role of Criminal Law in Virtual Worlds, 11
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 53–60 (2008) [hereinafter Fantasy Crime] (analyzing the propriety of criminalizing fantasy crimes committed in the virtual world).
See Virtual Crime, supra note 167, at ¶ 34.
Id.
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171

tor will be located in the real world.
Third, attendant circumstances will be present when the perpetrator was not legally entitled to
engage in the specific conduct at issue.
The element of harm is the most challenging requirement to satisfy because in order for an individual to suffer harm, the virtual conduct must have some real world impact. Real world harm could include financial consequences or emotional consequences. For
example, the transfers of money in the real world, the loss of money
in the real world, or the destruction of the financial market in the
real world are all real world financial consequences. Virtual world
conduct that results in real mental pain and suffering for an individual in the real world can also be considered a real world emotional
consequence.
There are three types of virtual crimes that have gained some attention in recent years—virtual theft, virtual rape, and virtual harassment. We now discuss examples of each. These examples range in
the way they have been handled, and will later be used to suggest how
to prosecute virtual money laundering, virtual recruitment and
communication, and virtual terrorism.
2. Virtual Theft
Gamers import and export real world money in and out of virtual
172
worlds. This real world money can be used to acquire virtual prop173
erty, thereby giving virtual property value in the real world. Virtual
174
property can be traded in the real world, and virtual property can
also be stolen. Thus, the owner of a virtual perpetrator avatar could
be subjected to real world criminal liability for the taking of one’s
property in the virtual world.
The United States has yet to prosecute a virtual theft; however,
such an opportunity arose in 2008 when a user’s account in the
MMORPG Final Fantasy XI was broken into, and items and currency
175
valued at about $3800 were stolen. The theft occurred to a user liv-

171
172
173
174
175



Id. at ¶ 8 (stating that it is not possible to hypothesize difference between real world
crimes and cybercrimes pertaining to the element of mental state).
Fantasy Crime, supra note 168, at 65.
Id. at 70 (“Since the virtual property was purchased with ‘real’ money, its loss inflicts a
harm that resounds in the physical world.”).
Id. In conducting my own investigation, I have discovered that eBay sells Linden Dollars
in exchange for United States currency.
See Earnest Cavalli, Police Refuse to Aid in Virtual Theft Case, WIRED (Feb. 4, 2008, 1:25 PM),
http://www.wired.com/gamelife/2008/02/police-refuse-t/ (“After the loss of almost
$4,000 USD in virtual goods and currency, Final Fantasy XI player Geoff Luurs brought his
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ing in Blaine, Minnesota, and the local police force found that the
user’s goods were “devoid of monetary value” and reasoned that no
176
theft had actually occurred. This outcome could have occurred for
a variety of reasons. First, it is arguable that the local police force was
not familiar with the use of real world money to purchase virtual
177
property.
Thus, this virtual theft was not prosecuted, and the
wrongdoer went unpunished. Second, it is possible that the amount
of money involved in this virtual theft was not enough to prosecute
and expend resources on. However, if a well-known company, such
as IBM, lost money, then maybe some action by the local police force
178
would have occurred. Either way, the United States is reluctant to
consider thefts that occur in the virtual world as crimes.
In contrast, the international community has taken steps to attempt to prosecute and punish users who commit virtual theft. For
example, in 2009, a three-year prison sentence was issued to a known
179
gang member for extorting virtual goods. According to Chinese officials, three suspects cornered the victim in a virtual cyber café and
noticed he had a particularly large balance of virtual goods in his QQ180
Tencent account.
A virtual assault ensued and the victim was
forced to turn over the equivalent of nearly 100,000 RMB of the vir181
tual currency QQ coins. This case is interesting in that it may show
that virtual goods must have value since an arrest and prosecution
occurred, and thus could set a precedent in prosecuting virtual theft.
In another example, in 2007, the Dutch police force arrested a teenager for stealing nearly $6000 worth of virtual property in the Finland-based MMO Habbo Hotel, but the outcome of this arrest is un182
clear.
In another case in 2005, the Japanese police arrested a
Chinese exchange student for stealing virtual property in the Asian

176
177
178
179
180
181
182

case before the Blaine, Minnesota[,] police department only to be refused any kind of
aid.”).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id.
Four People Sentenced for Virtual Property Theft, CHINA VIEW (May 24, 2009, 4:41 PM),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-05/24/content_11427265.htm.
Id.
Id.
‘Virtual Theft’ Leads to Arrest, BBC NEWS (Nov. 14, 2007, 2:37 PM),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/7094764.stm; see also Wagner James Au, Why Virtual Theft Should Matter to Real Life Tech Companies, GIGAOM (Nov. 18, 2007), http://
gigaom.com/2007/11/18/why-virtual-theft-should-matter-to-real-life-tech-companies/.

1070

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 14:4
183

MMORPG, Lineage II, and then reselling it on eBay.
Lastly, the
South Korean police force has developed a special unit that deals
with in-game crimes, which is often inundated with virtual theft re184
ports.
3. Virtual Rape
In order for a perpetrator to be held criminally responsible for
rape, there needs to be nonconsensual sexual intercourse with a vic185
tim, often through use of physical force. Some critics believe that a
rapist in the virtual world may not be prosecuted in the real world
because there is no real world harm since an actual person was not
186
raped. However, others claim that the individual behind the avatar
being raped can suffer severe trauma that can be similar to what one
187
would experience from actually being raped. In this situation, the
harm would be mental instead of physical. However, rape requires a
physical assault, placing this criminal conduct solely in the real world
and not in the virtual world under our current law.
Nevertheless, “virtual rape”, which can occur through text, animation, malicious scripts, or other means instead of by physical force, is
a concern of some. In the virtual world LamdaMOO, a text-based
188
multi-user environment, a user, Mr. Bungle, used “voodoo dolls,”
which are codes represented by objects, to gain control over another
189
user’s avatar. Here, voodoo dolls were used by Mr. Bungle to make
it appear that other users were participating in explicit, violent sexual
acts in an extremely public part of the virtual world, known as the liv-

183

184

185
186
187

188
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Student Arrested for Robbing Another Player Inside an Online Game, INFORMATIONWEEK (Aug.
22, 2005, 2:24 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/showArticle.jhtml?
articleID=169500364.
Jeremy Hsu, Video Game Property Insurance Protects Virtual Goods, INNOVATIONNEWSDAILY,
(July 7, 2011, 12:56 PM), http://www.innovationnewsdaily.com/418-insurance-virtualitems-games.html.
18 U.S.C. § 2242 (2006).
Virtual Crime, supra note 167, at ¶ 105.
RCASA’s Friday Facts: Avatar Rape in Virtual Reality, RAPPAHANNOCK COUNCIL AGAINST
SEXUAL ASSAULT BLOG (Nov. 5, 2010, 8:00 AM), http://rcasa.wordpress.com/2010/11/
05/rcasas-friday-facts-avatar-rape-in-virtual-reality/.
Regina Lynn, Virtual Rape Is Traumatic, but Is It a Crime?, WIRED (May 4, 2007),
http://www.wired.com/culture/lifestyle/commentary/sexdrive/2007/05/sexdrive_0504;
see also Julian Dibbell, A Rape in Cyberspace, VILLAGE VOICE (Oct. 18, 2005), http://
www.villagevoice.com/2005-10-18/specials/a-rape-in-cyberspace/.
Benjamin Duranske, Reader Roundtable: “Virtual Rape” Claim Brings Belgian Police to Second
Life, VIRTUALLY BLIND (Apr. 24, 2007), http://virtuallyblind.com/2007/04/24/openroundtable-allegations-of-virtual-rape-bring-belgian-police-to-second-life/.
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190

ing room. “[T]he victims of Mr. Bungle’s [conduct] were shocked
and traumatized by how he had manipulated their online characters
191
and by how powerless they had been to stop him.” There was a lot
of uproar regarding Mr. Bungle’s conduct in the virtual world, which
resulted in a programmer of LamdaMOO terminating the actual us192
er’s existence in this virtual world. Another virtual rape allegation
occurred in 2007, which resulted in the Belgium police wanting to
patrol Second Life, but it is unclear whether they were given the au193
thority to do so. Neither of these incidents was handled by the real
world legal system through the imposition of criminal liability for
these activities that occurred in the virtual world.
4. Virtual Harassment
Virtual harassment has become a known problem in MMORPGs
and virtual worlds. However, this problem is usually dealt with by the
entity that operates the MMORPG or virtual world, typically by suspending offending players or banning them entirely. For example,
Second Life allows users to file abuse reports when there is a violation
194
of Linden Lab’s Terms of Service or Community Standards.
The
abuse report is submitted to customer service, and it then takes appropriate action, which ranges from an “official warning to a suspension or permanent termination of the abuser’s access to the Second
195
Life world.”
5. Application to Virtual Terrorism Conduct
These examples show that there are different classes of virtual
crimes, and we have different abilities to prosecute them in the real
world. First, there are the virtual world crimes where the harm in the
real world can be proven, for example, virtual theft. These types of
crimes appear to be the easiest to prosecute in the real world. Like
virtual theft, laundering money through the virtual world has real
world consequences that can be ascertained. The consequence of
laundering money is that one party loses a certain amount of money
190
191
192
193
194

195

Id.; see also Dibbell, supra note 188.
Virtual Crime, supra note 167, at ¶ 104.
Dibbell, supra note 188.
Lynn, supra note 188.
Linden Lab Official:
How to Handle Online Harassment, SECOND LIFE WIKI,
http://community.secondlife.com/t5/English-Knowledge-Base/How-to-deal-with-abuseand-harassment/ta-p/1339983 (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
Id.
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while another illegally gains that amount. Therefore, prosecuting
terrorists for using virtual worlds to launder money can be prosecuted in the real world.
Second, there are virtual world crimes that have real world consequences but do not necessarily cause the harm that is required under
the current United States Criminal Code to amount to a crime, for
196
example virtual rape.
Prosecuting virtual terrorist activity, such as
communication, recruitment, or collecting virtual weapons, could fall
under this category because it would be hard to prove that this conduct in the virtual world would result in harm in the real world.
However, if it can be proven that the preparatory conduct actually led
to a real world terrorist activity or that the virtual terrorist activity
ended up being carried out in the real world, then there is the possibility of prosecuting the user in the real world because the real world
harm would be easily ascertained. Therefore, if real world harm is
proven, then this virtual world conduct could also fall under the first
category.
Finally, there is the category of virtual world crimes that only impact users in the virtual world, for example virtual harassment. Punishing terrorists who use the virtual world to communicate and recruit new terrorists could fall within this category as long as the
impact is only felt within the virtual world. If this is so, then punishing users may be better handled by the virtual world itself, by either
having the host deactivate the users’ accounts temporarily or banishing the users from the virtual world altogether.
F. Who Should Police the Virtual World?
There are at least three different options regarding who should
police the virtual world—the virtual world itself, local police, and/or
federal authorities. The virtual world can police its users’ conduct
through User Agreements, “community rules” and “privacy policies,”
or by holding ISPs responsible for policing user content. First, User
Agreements have been used to terminate a user’s account if the user
has committed an illegal act. The User Agreement can also reference
a real world statute through which the offending user can be prosecuted under in the real world. This, for example, has been done in
197
regards to copyright. Second, “community rules” and “privacy poli196
197



See supra Part III.E.3.
David Assalone, Comment, Law in the Virtual World: Should the Surreal World of Online
Communities Be Brought Back to Earth by Real World Laws?, 16 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 163,
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cies” can specifically prohibit certain conduct and if a person engages
in the prohibited conduct, the virtual world can punish the user. The
“community rules” and “privacy polices” can also include mandatory
reporting provisions, which mean that other users have a duty to report any illegal conduct that they observe or know about that is taking place in the virtual world. Virtual world operators, such as World
of Warcraft’s Blizzard Entertainment, try “to foresee vulnerabilities
198
and address them as they become apparent.” Third, under § 230 of
the Communications Decency Act, which is part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, an ISP can be held responsible for policing user content. An ISP can restrict access to certain material or give oth199
ers the technical means to restrict access to that material.
While state laws and local laws could govern conduct in the virtual
world for users located in a given region, each region may handle virtual crimes differently, which could result in the unequal punishment
among users from different states for the same conduct on the Internet, which is inherently not bound by geopolitical boundaries.
Federal authorities could also police the virtual world. As previously mentioned, the federal government retains the power to ensure that networks are “intercept-capable” and have data retention
for a particular period. Additionally, the federal government can also
require that the service agreement between Linden Lab and its users
be drafted in such a way as to make it easier for the company to monitor and control illegal conduct by its users in the virtual world. For
example, the definition of illegal conduct could be expanded to include virtual terrorism and virtual preparatory conduct.
There has been some effort by federal authorities to start looking
at ways to monitor virtual worlds, such as World of Warcraft. The
United States intelligence community has been trying to develop
software that will detect violent extremists infiltrating these multi200
player games. This software is called the “The Reynard Project” and
will profile online gaming behavior with the goal of “automatically
201
detecting suspicious behavior and actions in the virtual world.”
Moreover, some government officials, such as Hillary Clinton, are en-
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Thier, supra note 146.
Communications Decency Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
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(Feb. 22, 2008, 11:15 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/02/nations-spies-w/.
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couraging international cooperation to police the Internet, using
“voluntary standards for prosecuting cybercriminals, protecting intellectual property, securing networks, and pursuing terrorists who use
203
cyberspace to plan attacks and woo followers.”
So steps are being
made to address this growing concern about virtual worlds being
used to harbor terrorist organizations.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Currently, there is no settled method on how to handle the privacy rights of avatars in the virtual world. However, using virtual worlds
to carry out terrorist activities, recruit, communicate, and launder
money is a growing concern that may require the United States and
other countries to either use existing laws or create new legislation
that permits the federal government or Internet Service Providers to
monitor this type of conduct in the virtual world. Currently, there is
existing law that could apply to permit either the government or ISPs
to monitor conduct in the virtual world. For example, although the
Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy extends to
conduct in the virtual world, it does not extend to conduct that is
considered illegal or conduct that falls under a judicially created exception to the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, the Wiretap Act
would protect communication in the virtual world between avatars
from government intrusion unless there was an applicable exception,
such as the exigent circumstances, consent, or ISP exceptions, which
would permit the interception of this communication. Moreover,
conduct and communication in the virtual world would fall outside
the scope of FISA. However, even if FISA did apply, there are exceptions that could apply, such as when no U.S. person is a party to the
communication, which would permit the interception and surveillance of the communication and conduct without a warrant. Additionally, CALEA would apply as long as virtual worlds are considered
a provider of wire or electronic communication. Based on the analy204
sis in this Article, virtual worlds would be considered as such. Lastly, information exchanged and conduct engaged in could be monitored or intercepted through NSLs, but as discussed in the Article,
this is a contested area of the law that may not be applicable if expanded to virtual worlds. There is some existing federal law that
202
203
204
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permits the surveillance of an avatar’s conduct in the virtual world
under certain circumstances. With that said, virtual worlds, specifically privacy rights in virtual worlds, are not addressed in any of these
laws; therefore, a more effective method would be to enact a new law
or amend an existing law to include the ability to monitor virtual
worlds in order to protect against terrorist organizations using them
as breeding grounds for terrorism in the real world.
The issue of prosecuting offending avatars for conduct observed
in the virtual world is challenging because attribution may be difficult. Virtual crimes, such as theft, rape, and harassment, have been
occurring and still occur in the virtual worlds. Traditional criminal
statutes that are relied upon to prosecute a criminal come up short
for crimes in the virtual world because there is either no real world
harm or the elements necessary to be prosecuted for a crime are not
satisfied. This results in virtual wrongdoers going unpunished. This
issue could be addressed by tailoring the current criminal statutes to
include illegal conduct, such as recruiting, communicating, money
laundering, and bombing, done in the virtual worlds by terrorist organizations. The United States, as well as the rest of the world, needs
to be prepared when these virtual terrorist acts start to be identified
and prosecuted. The ways in which virtual theft, rape, or harassment
have been prosecuted can be used as models to help the United
States, or the international community as a whole, combat virtual terrorism that results in actual real-world terrorism.
Since developing new laws takes time and effort, the easiest way to
permit law enforcement to monitor an avatar’s conduct is by including a provision in a privacy statement or terms of service explaining
that an individual’s conduct in the virtual world is subject to government surveillance and prosecution. Virtual worlds, such as Second
Life, have already taken to this, specifically in situations of child pornography. However, these privacy statements or terms of service
could be extended to include virtual terrorism.
V.

FUTURE WORK

This paper has dealt with the ability to monitor conduct amounting to terrorism in the virtual world through the Fourth Amendment,
the Wiretap Act, FISA, CALEA, and NSLs. However, there are a variety of topics that have been left untouched but may have been addressed by earlier authors. One such topic is whether international
law and treaties should be applied to the virtual worlds and how foreign governments should handle or have handled illegal conduct that
occurs in the virtual world. This is an important topic. Conflicting
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laws may result in the wrongdoer engaging in forum shopping and
being prosecuted in areas that have tougher laws but avoiding liability
in areas with less strict laws. Harmonizing how international laws and
treaties are applied will assist in preventing this unwanted outcome.
An additional topic that has been left untouched is the role of the
free speech rights found in the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution, which are implicated by proscribing conduct or speech.
It can be argued that this speech is unprotected by the First Amendment because it constitutes fighting words or imminent threats. On
the other hand, this speech could be regulated as a time, place, and
manner restriction. Another topic of importance is the issue of attribution and making sure the actual wrongdoer is the one being prosecuted and punished. Finally, as mentioned in the Article, another
topic that has not been discussed is whether the real world crime of
conspiracy is meaningful and applicable in the virtual world.

